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The economic reforms that were launched in the late-1970s significantly altered the 
provision of public goods for both rural and urban China. Provision was shifted from 
government, work places or the collectives in rural China to local governments, 
families and clans, and eventually to market-based institutions. Initially, it seems the 
Chinese leadership had not thought through the consequences of this 
decentralization and market-based reforms.1 With the de facto dismantling of the 
collective institutions in the countryside and subsequently with the curtailment of 
workplace benefits in urban China, social support weakened or evaporated entirely 
for many. China’s integration into the global production chain rendered the 
institutional structures that had endured through the 1980s obsolescent. The 
economic restructuring of the state-owned enterprises and the growth of new 
sectors of the economy that drew in millions of migrant workers from the 
countryside forced tremendous change on the old residence and workplace-based 
system of welfare provision.2  
The market did not provide an adequate solution and with weak institutions 
of civil society, levels of welfare coverage began to drop and access to key services 
became more dependent on income than ever before. This led to the emergence of 
new forms of inequality and service access between rural and urban China. The 
fiscal decentralization that has been a key component of the economic reforms 
contributed further to the new inequalities. Those local governments with access to 
greater resources have been able to mitigate the decline in pre-reform service 
delivery mechanisms.  
  It took the Chinese leadership some time to understand these challenges and 
to build new institutions to deal with service delivery. New categories of citizens 
emerged with different demands on the state and reforms changed notions of 
entitlement. To whom does the state have an obligation to provide welfare and at 
what level? In the mid-1990s as the major restructuring of state-owned enterprises 
intensified, it was clear that the social costs could become destabilizing.   3 
Consequently, the central leadership began to pull together local experiments into a 
comprehensive framework for the privileged groups in urban China.  This involved 
transferring responsibility for social welfare from the workplace to local 
governments. However, these initial reforms still left most people in rural China and 
those working in the informal sector to their own devices. When Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao assumed power in 2003-04 they recognized that some of the problems of 
social development would not be solved by growth alone. This realization led to the 
development of a more coherent policy framework based on identification of 
vulnerable groups that were then provided with targeted support. Policy began to 
shift from the provision of short-term safety nets to developing a more integrated, 
comprehensive system. Policy sought to provide greater guarantees to China’s rural 
population and to integrate the growing numbers of migrants into welfare 
structures away from their homes.  
  The new leadership has realized that social policy is an indispensible element 
of rule. Ever since Bismark set up the first welfare structures and welfare programs, 
social policy has been recognized as a key instrument of state building, political rule, 
social control, maintaining social order, efficiency, and regime legitimacy. Certainly, 
social policy in China has begun to resemble that of other countries in East Asia but 
currently the long-term trajectory is unclear.  Will the Chinese polity evolve through 
a phase of a “developmental welfare state” to a more fully developed “welfare state” 
as in South Korea or Taiwan? Or will the polity remain more unchangingly selective 
in terms of welfare provision as in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore?  
The dominant ideology espoused by the central leadership might suggest 
movement towards a more inclusive system based on a notion of citizenship. The 
references to socialism, albeit with Chinese characteristics, and the stress by 
General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao on building a “harmonious 
society” and “putting people first” seem to suggest a more inclusive system. Since 
taking power, they have sought to extend benefits to excluded groups such as 
migrants and have tried to reduce the cost of basic services for the rural population. 
Thus, since 2003, experimentation with rural new pension scheme was stepped up;   4 
since 2003 there has been a major push to extend coverage of the new rural 
cooperative medical insurance; in 2006 agricultural taxes were abolished entirely; 
in 2007 all rural residents no longer were expected to pay miscellaneous school fees 
and free compulsory education was introduced for rural children; and also in 2007 
the leadership pledged to extend minimum living support payments across rural 
China. A number of measures were introduced in 2002-03 to improve the lot of 
migrant workers, who, in theory, had been brought into pension schemes in 1999. In 
June 2002, it was announced that migrant workers should be able to take out 
industrial injury insurance; in November 2002, migrants were accorded the 
important status of being a part of the working-class; in January 2003, the State 
Council confirmed that migrants be accorded equal treatment with urban residents 
when applying for work and urban education departments had to recognize schools 
for migrant children and provide them with equal education access; and in 2006 the 
State council set up a joint committee to coordinate rural migration affairs across 
different ministries. In June 2010, the State Council announced the Central 
Government would gradually introduce a residence permit system nationwide that 
could replace the household registration system. The residence permits would 
enable migrants to enjoy the same social security benefits as urban residents and 
allow them eventually to apply for residency in the cities. The reform was being 
implemented in 10 cities.3 
Current economic practice, however, is less clear and the financial pressures 
on local governments might suggest that policy implementation will continue with 
selective service provision coupled with inequalities reinforced by institutional 
structures such as the household registration system. While many local 
governments have moved to implement the central directives, they have also 
devised strategies to limit the impact and there remains significant variance 
between what an urban inhabitant can expect compared with their rural 
counterpart, while migrants in rural and urban areas continue to be seen and 
treated as second-class citizens by many local authorities.4 For example, Beijing 
Municipality has sought to provide compulsory education for migrant children but   5 
other barriers persist. Already in 1998-99 some districts began to recognize schools 
for migrant children that had been set up. Further on April 15, 2010 the Beijing 
Municipal Education Commissions proposed for the first time that the children of 
migrant workers should receive compulsory education in a neighborhood school 
without having to take an exam. This would give them the same rights as Beijing 
children with an official residence permit (hukou). This was to be phased in over a 
three to five year period.5 However, there is still a problem with entry to high school 
as the children may have to return to the rural home to take the entrance exam.6  
The round up of migrants before the Beijing Olympics (summer 2008) and the 
decision in March 2010 to relocate around 1 million migrant workers from 
Chaoyang by demolishing villages with a high density of migrant residents and to 
replace them with “more civilized” residents to “improve the population structure” 
showed their continued vulnerability.7 Further in July 2010, the Chinese 
government introduced its anti-crime measure of “sealed management” that 
effectively provided a nighttime lock down of migrant communities from 11:00 p.m. 
to 6:00 a.m. In Beijing, the authorities initially installed gates around 16 migrant 
communities.8 
This paper uses a case study of the evolution of education and healthcare 
provision in Yantian Village, Guangdong Province to examine these trends. It makes 
no claims that development in Yantian is typical for rural China but it may allow 
some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the extent of inclusiveness of social 
policy and the moves towards citizenship as a basis for redistribution policies and 
welfare provision. 
 
Yantian Village 
Yantian is not a normal village but rather is what people refer to as an “urban 
village” and it has been one of the major beneficiaries of economic reform. Lying 
close to Hong Kong and Shenzhen, it is in the hub of the Pearl River Delta that has 
become a key link in the global reorganization of manufacturing and production. As   6 
an administrative village, it comes under the jurisdiction of Fenggang Township, 
which itself is under Dongguan City, Guangdong Province. It has a good 
transportation network with an express route to Shenzhen and links from the 
village to the airport and train station. It takes only one hour to the Shenzhen 
airport and even less time to the Luowu railway station.  Yantian administrative 
village contains nine natural villages, Donger is the largest with over 640 
inhabitants and Shijie the smallest with only 140 people. The economic reforms, 
especially the opening to foreign investment, pursued since the late-1970s have 
replaced the water buffalo and rice paddies with China’s main export processing 
center. It has been a key center for foreign direct investment and, as a result, has 
attracted a large migrant community. The province of Guangdong is home to some 
30 million migrants, in 2010 Dongguan was home to 5.2 million migrants out of a 
total population of 6.95 million, Fenggang township had a registered population of 
20,000 and 300,000 migrants, 80,000 of whom lived in Yantian.9  
  The migrants in Dongguan and Yantian are referred to as “Xin Guaner” as 
opposed to the “Yantianer” who have a formal household registration in the village. 
This latter group, according to official statistics numbered 3,016 at the end of 2008. 
Over 60 per cent of the official residents belonged to the Deng family, the dominant 
group in the village, among whose number were many of the enterprise heads and 
the village party secretary.10 Major decisions in the village are made by the party 
branch, the villagers’ committee and the village shareholding economic cooperative. 
The Deng family dominated these organizations, six of the seven members of the 
party branch, four of the five members of the villagers’ committee, and five of the 
seven members of the shareholders economic cooperative came from the Deng 
family. Two other institutions that are influential are the villagers’ representative 
meeting and the shareholders’ representative meeting. The vast majority of the 
population, the migrants, is not involved in any of these bodies. The lack of an 
official registration has major consequences for political status, social identity and 
welfare access.    7 
  The migrants work primarily in the 200 or so foreign invested enterprises 
vested in Yantian (there were over 400 at their peak).11 However, the group of 
migrants is not homogenous and this has consequences for how they are treated 
within the village. Investors are treated far better than those working in the 
factories. In addition, there are a number of migrants working in agriculture and a 
number of private entrepreneurs running small businesses. Essentially, since 1992, 
with very few exceptions, official residents of Dongguan are not engaged in 
agriculture. Even daily necessities such as vegetables, are provided by migrants who 
have sub-contracted the land from the village collective. Most importantly, the 
migrants are not eligible for any payout from the dividends from the village 
collective that has provided the relative wealth for the local residents.  
The village collective made a net profit of 130.5 million yuan in 2008. This 
was the amount that could be redistributed among the members of the collective. 
Regulations adopted in 2003 govern how this profit should be divided up. The three 
committees (village party branch, villagers’ committee and the shareholders’ 
economic cooperative) decided that 53 per cent of the net profits (69.17 million 
yuan) would be held for the public reserve fund and welfare. This left 61.43 million 
as the dividend for collective and individual shares. The regulations stipulate that 
the collective share should account for 38 per cent of the remaining profits, in this 
case 23.31 million yuan. The collective share was used for important construction 
projects and public goods’ provision and services that were important for the 
development of the village community.  This left 38.03 million yuan to be shared by 
761 shareholder families, comprising 2,988 individuals. Therefore, each individual 
shareholder was to receive 12, 727 yuan, an average of roughly 50,000 yuan for each 
household.  
 
Providing Education for All 
The rapid development of Yantian with the influx of foreign investment and the 
large number of migrants who moved into the village put tremendous pressure on   8 
the educational services. This led to the emergence of a network of different types of 
schools catering to the varied needs within the community. The range of schools 
available did mean that all children in Yantian were able to find schooling 
irrespective of family background but the quality and investment varied 
significantly. Most importantly, from 2008 the government budget covered the costs 
for migrant children helping overcome the biggest inequity of the previous years. 
Yet, differences remained with respect to the quality of the teachers and the 
infrastructure in the schools.  
  From the beginning of the economic reforms, Yantian stood out from most 
rural areas with its diverse educational structure rather than relying solely on 
government provision of elementary education. Yantian had government-run public 
schools, collective-run schools operated by the administrative village, shareholder 
schools financed jointly by the village collective and private investors, and private 
schools sponsored entirely by individuals. This structure derived from the different 
needs within Yantian. Domestic and overseas investors with businesses in Yantian 
wanted to send their children to good schools, even if the tuition fees might be more 
expensive than those for a public school. Yantian villagers also wanted their children 
to attend good schools, especially schools run by the village collective as the fees 
were lower. The migrant workers could neither afford to send their children to very 
good, elite private schools, nor did they have access to the schools run by the 
collective, which only enrolled children of local villagers. Before new policies were 
introduced in 2008, they could only send their children to special schools set up by 
the village collective.  
  In 1952, the government took over the well established private Zhentian 
School and it was renamed the Yantian Elementary School. It was a large village 
school financed mainly through government funds, with sufficient allowances from 
the township government and the village collective. The tuition fee was quite low, 
each student only needed to pay two yuan for miscellaneous charges (including 
textbook charges). The growth of the local economy in the 1980s allowed the village 
in 1988 to invest 1.7 million yuan to upgrade the facilities for the school and it   9 
invested a further 1.15 million yuan in 1993. On September 1, 2003 the school 
underwent another significant change. The Zhentian School was resurrected, 
financed by the village collective. Students with a local household registration 
transferred to the school leaving the Elementary School to cater for the children of 
migrant workers.  
  In 1988, the village party secretary proposed that the village collective build 
a middle school to provide convenient access for village children and, more 
importantly, to train the talent pool for Yantian’s expansion. In 1989, the collective 
invested 6 million yuan to build the Yantian Middle School, the first middle school in 
rural Dongguan that was not government funded. With few exceptions, the School 
only recruited local village students and the children of staff working at the 
Dongshen Water Supply Project Management Bureau. The School developed a good 
reputation such that in 1993 it attracted an investor from Guangzhou, Yang Zhimao, 
who proposed building a more sophisticated private school on the foundations on 
the middle school.  
The new school was named the “New Century Talents School” and it was set 
on a more market-oriented trajectory. This was bad news for local students as it 
began to recruit students nationwide and charged high fees. The village collective 
provided some subsidy but it remained an expensive proposition. Moreover, with 
village children sharing the classroom with those from outside, it meant that the 
original objective of training students for local needs was no longer feasible.  
This prompted the village leaders to finance a new collective school that was 
only for local students. This new school carried the name of the old Zhentian School 
and was opened on September 1, 2003. The 35 million yuan needed to build the 
school was provided entirely by the collective.  It is a comprehensive school 
including a kindergarten, and elementary and middle schools.12 The village 
collective appoints the school leaders but the school follows national rules in terms 
of development of teaching schedules and the use of textbooks. Although Yantian 
villagers refer to the school as a “village-run public school,” it relies on the   10 
investment of the village collective that directly manages it for the benefit of the 
village children. In addition to the Yantian children, the school did also enroll 
migrant children. However, these migrants were not those working away in the 
factories but rather those who were deemed to have contributed significantly to 
Yantian’s development. These included children of investors who had started a 
business in Yantian, middle and senior management of foreign companies, those 
who had purchased commercial property in Yantian, and those who had served in 
the military. Students from different backgrounds were subject to different tuition 
fees and charges: local students (regular students) paid 240 yuan each semester 
while immigrant students (transient students) paid 845 yuan, 3.5 times the former. 
The nature of the school changed again after 2006 when the Chinese government 
began its program to promote free elementary education in the countryside. With 
such a favorable policy now in place, why should the village collective finance 
schools out of their own budget? Village leaders told us that the collective invested 
over 3 million yuan annually to maintain the school’s operations. According to the 
Dean, Deng Jingzhong, the number of students increased to 944 in 2008, each 
requiring a per capita expenditure of 1,200 yuan per semester. Most of the 3 million 
expenditures was covered by the collective with supplemental revenue from tuition 
fees and charges (see Table One). A local government takeover of the school’s 
administration could save the village collective a significant amount of money. Thus, 
in 2006 the village collective applied to the relevant authorities in Dongguan City to 
convert Zhentian School from a village-run to a government –run school and to shift 
the management responsibility from the village collective to the township 
government. However, this would mean dropping the middle school provision as no 
public middle schools are run in the countryside. Thus, in August 2006 the village 
collective decided to abolish the middle school branch and Zhentian just operated as 
a rural elementary school.  
It is clear that the government subsidy does not cover all the costs of rural 
education. Yantian is fortunate in being an affluent community and thus the village 
collective could still afford to put in between 300,000 and 400,000 yuan as   11 
necessary to cover any shortfall in funding. Poorer communities are not so 
fortunate. Christine Wong has noted that the abolition of the miscellaneous 
education fees and their replacement by transfers to cover elementary education 
costs might actually end up causing a shortfall in income for local governments. The 
subsidy from the central government covers only a portion of the revenue that local 
governments used to derive from various education-related fees and levies. The 
initial subsidy was 140 yuan for elementary school students and 180 yuan for junior 
middle school students. However, before the new program began, the costs were 
much higher; in one of the schools she visited, the cost was 1,000 yuan per 
student.13  
 
Table 1: Funding Sources for Zhentian School, 2003 – 2006 
Item  2003-2004  2004-2005  2005-2006  Total 
Revenue from 
tuition and 
charges 
(yuan) 
111,747  357,450  653,535  1,122,732 
Investment by 
village 
collective 
(yuan) 
244,000  3,000,000  3,300,000  6,544,000 
Other (yuan)  1,753,000  521,141  172,342  2,446,483 
Total (yuan)  2,108,747  3,878,591  4,125,877  10,113,215 
Source: Interview with Dean Deng Jingzhong, July 2008. 
 
Of the 944 students admitted in 2008, 123 were local students with a Yantian 
household registration, 223 students were categorized as “house-purchase 
students” (the parents were not local residents but had purchased commercial 
property in Yantian), or “factory-running students” (whose parents ran factories in   12 
Yantian), or “contribution students” (whose parents had made a special 
contribution to Yantian’s development); the remaining 598 students were children 
of migrant workers, who were often called the “Xin Guaner” (New Dongguan 
People). In 2008, the Zhentian School charged nothing, only a six yuan per capita fee 
each semester for a physical checkup to local students, “house-purchasing students”, 
“factory-running students” and “contribution students.” By contrast the “Xin Guaner” 
paid 936 yuan for tuition and textbooks each semester.  
There is also bias against the migrants in the admissions process. Local Yantian 
children are admitted automatically without having to sit for an examination. The 
“Xin Guaner” children would have to undergo strict interviews and if they failed, 
they would only be able to attend the Yantian School for migrant workers’ 
children. This was the former public Yantian Elementary School that was converted 
into a school for migrant children covering both elementary and middle school 
students. Local children were phased out by 2006. The School was defined as a 
“public school with non-state contribution.” It was managed by the Culture and 
Education Office of Fenggang Township on behalf of the government and was the 
first school within the township dedicated to the education of migrant children. 
Thus, there is a distinct disparity for admission standards and charges between local 
students, “house-purchasing students”, “factory-running students” and 
“contribution students” on the one hand, and children of migrant workers on the 
other.  
Yantian, as a public school, should have received the necessary funding from the 
government but the village collective gave the school buildings free of charge and 
also provided financial support each year. The designation “non-state contribution” 
meant that operating expenses were also derived from tuition charges. Initially, the 
school charged pupils 885 yuan per semester (including 210 yuan for miscellaneous 
fees, such as for textbooks, physical checkup, and school uniforms); 1,770 yuan 
annually. Middle school students paid 1,400 yuan per semester (miscellaneous 
charges included) in 2003 and 2004, and 1,600 yuan in 2005; 3,200 yuan annually. If 
we take the year 2006 as an example it had 40 classes in total (six grades with  six   13 
classes in each grade and also a seventh and eighth grade with two classes in 
each).14 In the whole school, there were 2,222 students.15 According to the tuition 
levels for that year, the school should have received around 5 million yuan from the 
students. The school received only 1.3 million yuan from government and 
collective– 1 million yuan from Fenggang Township Government and 300,000 yuan 
from the Yantian village collective. The contribution by the Fenggang Township 
Government had risen from 500,000 yuan. In light of the funding sources, it would 
have been more accurate to characterize the Yantian School as a non-state school 
with a public contribution.  
Following Central Government policy to provide education for migrant children, 
in September 2007 the school was converted fully into a public school with migrant 
children enjoying the same treatment as local children. In theory, school operating 
expenses were to be covered by the government, mainly by the township 
government. However, in practice even though the township’s annual contribution 
did increase to 1.8 million yuan from January 1, 2008, the amount was still 
significantly less than what was needed. Tuition from the students remained the 
main source of funding. According to the latest information we obtained, from 
September 2009 pupils and middle school students were exempted from paying 
tuition and textbook charges, but not the charge for the school uniform, the cost of 
which was covered by the township government. 
To cater for the top end of the market, there was the new Century Talents 
School. This was a boarding school that was built on the basis of the collective-run 
Yantian Middle School. As noted, this was developed together with a Guangzhou 
businessman, Yang Zhimao. It provided education from kindergarten through high 
school and was immediately endorsed by the Dongguan City Government. The 
original 1993 agreement gave the village collective 30 per cent of the shares in the 
New Century Education Extension Ltd. Co. that oversaw the school. This was based 
on the value of the land donated and the tangible and intangible assets of the former 
Yantian Middle School. The fees were high, around 4,000 yuan per semester for day 
students and 8,000 to 9,000 yuan for boarders and, in addition parents had to pay   14 
between 150,000 to 200,000 yuan into a reserve fund. In addition, a number of 
students were admitted to the school as public school students in accordance with 
the plan of the Dongguan City Government. These students were obliged to pay 
1,150 yuan per semester together with a lodging fee of 225 yuan. There were also 
benefits for local students. Initially, they only had to pay 3,000 yuan per semester, 
irrespective of grade, with 2,000 yuan covered by the collective. After 2007, the 
village stopped paying the subsidy but the school offered a tuition waver of 500 
yuan per semester as well as for the students classified as “house purchasing 
students,” “factory-running students,” and “contribution students.” With 
government policy shifting to pick-up the costs of education for rural children, the 
school was overwhelmingly for wealthy migrants (Xin Guaner) who made up 80 per 
cent of the students. 
The shifting demographics of Yantian and the impact of government policy led 
to a varied educational structure in the village. The original public school in the 
administrative village was insufficient to take care of the demand and to increase 
supply quickly, a diverse network of public schools, collective-run schools, schools 
financed jointly by private investors and the collective as well as private schools was 
tolerated. This also took care of the needs of the 5,000 migrant children, culminating 
with the decision in 2007 that they should enjoy the same rights of access as local 
children. Despite this there remains a great disparity in the quality of education 
provision for the different types of families. Students at the New Century Talents 
School were mostly from high-income families; Zhentian School recruited students 
either with a local household registration, or from the families of influential 
investors who made a significant contribution to Yantian’s development; Yantian 
School recruited all its students from the families of migrant workers. In 2006 the 
New Century Talents School had 34 students in each class, compared to 38 in the 
Zhentian School and 60 in the Yantian School. The New Century Talents School had a 
total revenue of more than 7 million yuan from tuition and miscellaneous charges, 
while the Zhentian School had a total revenue of over 4 million yuan, including 3 
million yuan contributed by the Yantian village collective. By comparison, the   15 
Yantian School only received some 1.8 million yuan. The New Century Talents 
School had the same number of students as the Yantian School, slightly over 2,000, 
yet the former had a revenue steam four times that of the latter. The Zhentian 
School had less than half the number of students of Yantian but its operating 
expenses were twice that of Yantian. There were also sharp differences in terms of 
teaching resources. In 2006, the ratio between teachers and students was 1:15, 1:12 
and 1:28 respectively for New Century, Zhentian and Yantian Schools. A second 
difference was in terms of teacher qualifications. In 2006, the proportion of teachers 
with a bachelor’s degree was 67.3 per cent for New Century, 45 per cent for 
Zhentian and only 8.1 per cent for Yantian.  
 
Reviving Healthcare 
Economic reforms have had a dramatic impact on the provision of healthcare 
services in rural China and exacerbated pre-existing inequalities. Increasingly, the 
costs of medical care had to be borne by individuals and households. Facilities and 
providers declined in rural China. The number of beds in township health centers 
dropped from 0.78 million in 1980 to 0.69 million in 2006 before increasing to 0.85 
in 2008. The number of beds per 1,000 rural residents dropped from 0.95 in 1990 to 
a low of 0.76 in 2004 before rising again to 0.96 in 2008.16  There was also a 
dramatic decline in those with medical insurance. With the disbandment of the rural 
collective institutions, coverage dropped from 80 per cent in 1979 to only 2 per cent 
in 1987 before improving to 6.57 per cent in 1997.17 From 1997, there was first a 
gradual improvement with an increase in minimal coverage and the renewed 
promotion of the rural medical cooperative scheme beginning in 2003. The new 
scheme was intended to address the two problems of catastrophic illness and the 
poverty caused by medical bills. Since this revival, coverage has spread rapidly, with 
official figures claiming that coverage had risen in rural areas from 10.8 per cent in 
2004 to 75 per cent by 2007. By the end of 2008, coverage was reported at 91.5 per 
cent.18  These same trends are visible with healthcare provision in Yantian.   16 
  The reform period witnessed the emergence of a varied set of healthcare 
institutions. There was a public hospital (Yantian Branch Hospital of Fenggang 
Huaqiao Hospital), one public community-based health service center, one large 
private hospital, seventeen private clinics and some 50 unlicensed private clinics 
serving 80,000 local villagers and migrants.  
  The Yantian Branch Hospital was set up in 1993 within one of the production 
teams in Yantian and was under the jurisdiction of the Fenggang Huaqiao Hospital. 
Shortly after its establishment, poor performance caused the branch hospital to be 
contracted out for private operation. However, improved performance and 
restrictions placed by national regulations meant that it was taken back under 
government operational control in 2002. It was placed under the administration of 
the municipal health bureau. On a visit on July 9, 2008 we were told that the number 
of daily visits was between 400 and 500 with most patients being migrants, only 10 
per cent of the visits was from local villagers. All profits were turned over to the 
main hospital and the default rate on hospitalization payment was only 10,000 to 
20,000 yuan a year. This was because any serious case was referred to the main 
hospital. The main hospital was owed much larger sums. In Fenggang, all registered 
inhabitants were covered by rural cooperative medical insurance and thus, by and 
large, could afford to see a doctor. This was not the case for migrants and in 2005, 
the Director of the Fenggang Hospital estimated that of the 1.5 million yuan in 
unpaid bills, 99 per cent was owed by migrant workers.19  In Yantian, for those with 
a local registration, decent income and medical insurance, healthcare services were 
deemed to be accessible and affordable. However, the situation was different for 
migrant workers, especially if they were struck by catastrophic illness. This was 
particularly the case for those on contract employment with small private 
enterprises. Most such enterprises were reluctant to purchase medical insurance 
and without incremental government support, the increasing operational costs of 
the hospital were passed on to the patients.20  
  For many residents the most important institution is the Yantian Community 
Healthcare Service Station (CHS) that was set up as a result of an initiative taken by   17 
Dongguan City in late-2008. It falls under the jurisdiction of the Fenggang Township 
Community Health Center and as a result enjoys no financial autonomy. The 
initiative has its origins in the early-1997 joint Central Committee and State Council 
document that was drafted on the basis of discussions at a December 1996 National 
Conference on Health.21  This wide-ranging document summarized new policy 
initiatives and referred to the need to “reform the urban healthcare service system, 
actively promote community healthcare services and gradually develop a well-
functioning and user-friendly healthcare service network.” More specifically, on 
February 21, 2006 the State Council issued Document Number 10 on developing 
urban community healthcare services that decreed they should be viewed as a 
public good and not be set up to turn a profit. They were to be government-run but 
could receive investment from other organizations. The priority targets for CHS 
services were to be women, children, the elderly, patients with chronic diseases, the 
disabled and the poor.  Where conditions permitted, all cities and county-level 
towns were to set up the system by the end of 2010. One CHS center was to be 
planned for every 30,000 to 100,000 people.  
  These national guidelines were followed by local implementation 
regulations. On March 27, 2007 the Guangdong Provincial Government issued its 
proposals for all municipalities in the Pearl River Delta and small towns. Where 
conditions permitted, they were to strive to attain the goal of a “community-based 
solution to minor illness, prevention and health needs” before 2008.22 Township 
healthcare centers in the suburbs of cities were to be converted into CHS centers.  In 
terms of funding, the local government budget was to be used to develop 
community healthcare services, while basic medical services were to be 
compensated through service charges from medical insurance, medical financial 
assistance and out-of-pocket payments. Primary responsibility for subsidies was to 
be the responsibility of district/county level governments, while those services that 
met the appropriate criteria were to be incorporated into reimbursement from the 
medical insurance of urban employees.    18 
Important for this study, the Guangdong Provincial Government stated that, 
where conditions permitted, rural governments could also develop community 
healthcare services in line with the State Council’s “Guidelines .”23  This was 
followed on August 24, 2007 by Dongguan’s own document that required each 
township to set up one CHS center, under which CHS stations should be set up in 
villages where the population merited it and where there was sufficient demand for 
public services. Each CHS station was to have a catchment population of 8,000 to 
12,000. The migrant population was weighted at only 70 per cent of its total for the 
purposes of the calculations. The CHS were to prioritize preventative health, 
maternal and child health, family planning, and rehabilitation from chronic disease.  
The CHS were to be incorporated into the basic medical insurance program with the 
share of out-of-pocket payments to be lowered progressively in order to attract 
more community residents. It was estimated that 60 per cent of the outpatient 
expenses of the 5 million registered inhabitants of Dongguan would be reimbursed 
through medical insurance.24  
  The Yantian CHS opened on October 1, 2008 as a part of the attempt to 
realize a “five-minute health radius” within Fenggang Township. It was to serve 
both local residents and migrants and deliver the “6-in-1 services.”25 Its main stated 
objective is to “deliver life-cycle quality community healthcare services to Yantian 
residents” covering pediatrics, maternal care, elderly care, immunization, detection 
and reporting of communicable diseases, community-based diagnosis and treatment 
of common diseases, on-site first-aid, rehabilitation for disabled and mentally ill 
patients, and health record management.”26 Registered villagers who are enrolled in 
the medical insurance program run by the local social security department can get 
60 per cent of their medical expenses reimbursed on presentation of their ID, the 
remainder covered out-of-pocket. In fact, all Yantian villagers have been 
“compulsorily” enrolled in the medical insurance scheme with the premium 
deducted directly by the collective from their dividends. Most factories in Yantian 
have also purchased medical insurance for their employees, generating more   19 
patients for the CHS. This latter measure, of course, would benefit some of the 
migrant workers. 
  The most efficient medical institution in Yantian is the privately-run Guangji 
Hospital. Having provided the land for the hospital, the village collective took a 30 
per cent stake. The hospital draws patients from beyond Yantian but the bulk are 
local residents with some migrant workers. Factory workers make up about one-
third of the patients, while patients seeking gynecological and obstetric service 
make up another one-third (most of these are migrant women). Most of the low-
income migrants, however, find services in the 50 or so unlicensed private clinics 
that have lower prices. Some of those working in larger enterprises may be lucky 
enough to access in-house clinics such as the Jiali Group, Shinano Kenshi Motor 
Company and the New Century Talents School. 
  As elsewhere in China, economic reforms had a major impact on medical 
insurance within the village. From the early-1980s, Yantian Village started to 
transform its healthcare system from one based on a collective, cooperative scheme 
to one where village clinics ran on contracts. This meant villagers no longer enjoyed 
any guarantees for healthcare provision. Some of the wealthier families purchased 
commercial medical insurance, while certain production teams (such as Nanfang) 
set aside a partial fund from their collective revenues to subsidize members who 
suffered catastrophic or chronic disease and to provide a limited medical 
allowance.27 However, by 2000 Yantian Village had achieved universal coverage for 
its residents through a three-phase development. There was a fourth phase 
launched by the Dongguan City Government but, at the time of writing, Yantian had 
not implemented it.  
  In phase one, in 1999, Dongguan Municipal Government enacted provisional 
regulations on providing basic medical insurance for formal employees.28  Starting 
from March 1, 2000 the regulations authorized collection of an insurance premium 
across the city with reimbursements starting from May1. There were two types of 
medical insurance programs: comprehensive basic medical insurance and inpatient 
basic medical insurance. The former covered both inpatient and outpatient services,   20 
while the latter only reimbursed for hospitalization costs. The comprehensive basic 
medical insurance program introduced both social pooling and an individual 
account. Employers contributed the equivalent of 6.5 per cent of the individual 
employee’s salary and individuals contributed 2 per cent of their salary to the 
insurance program. While individual contributions went directly to the individual 
account, the employer’s contributions were transferred proportionately into the 
individual account according to the age of employees—the equivalent of 2 per cent 
of salary for those under 45, 2.3 per cent of salary for those 45 and above-45, and 
4.5 per cent of the average salary for retirees. The inpatient insurance program 
required only employer contribution—2 per cent of the average staff salary in the 
previous year. There was no individual contribution. The individual account could 
only be used to pay outpatient expenses and other basic medical expenses that met 
certain criteria. The pooled fund was used mainly to reimburse patients for their 
inpatient expenses beyond the deductible,29 subject to an annual cap.30 
The mandatory enrollment covered staff of government departments, public 
service units and social organizations, state-owned enterprises, collective 
enterprises under the city government, foreign enterprises under city government 
supervision, central and provincial enterprises stationed in Dongguan, and laid off 
workers of state-owned enterprises. Initially, the rural population was excluded. It 
was largely the same for basic inpatient insurance. It only covered employees and 
retirees of township-level collective enterprises, foreign enterprises under township 
government supervision and private enterprises, as well as the staff of township 
individual economic entities. Again the rural population was not granted 
participation. However, from 2000, with the encouragement of the Dongguan City 
Government, farmers in Yantian began to enroll in the citywide urban employees’ 
basic medical insurance. As of June 2006, 1341 Yantian villagers were enrolled in 
the urban employees’ basic medical insurance, accounting for 43 per cent of all 
registered villagers. 
In the second phase Dongguan City and Yantian Village responded to the Central 
Government’s 2003 call to set up the new rural cooperative medical scheme.31 This   21 
was defined as a voluntary public medical insurance with the household as the basic 
unit for participation. Already by May 22, 2003, 1,839 villagers had been enrolled in 
the scheme (64.1 per cent of the total) with the remaining 35.9 per cent enrolled in 
the employees basic medical insurance. Given the fact that the central government 
document was only distributed nationwide on January 16, 2003, it is evident that 
Yantian was energetic in promoting the new policy. 
However, shortly after the introduction of this scheme, on November 28, 20003 
Dongguan City proposed a new model for basic medical insurance for farmers.32 
First, the recently introduced rural cooperative medical scheme was incorporated 
into the basic medical insurance for farmers; second, village or township/district 
level pooling in the previous programs was upgraded into citywide pooling; third, 
management responsibilities were shifted from the health and agricultural 
authorities to the labor and social security department. Under the new insurance 
program, residents with a local registration (both rural and urban residents) who 
were not enrolled in the employees’ basic medical insurance could enroll in the 
basic medical insurance for farmers through the villagers’ committee.33 Funding for 
the insurance was mainly raised through individual contributions, with collective 
support and government subsidy. It did provide farmers with some reimbursement 
for their medical expenses.  
In early 2004, Dongguan City released the provisional regulations for the 
farmers’ basic medical insurance and on June 1, 2004 citywide collection of 
insurance premiums began. There were two tiers (A and B) for the insurance 
premiums and villagers’ committees could make their own choice depending on 
their level of economic development and the income level of farmers. In the first 
year, tier A had a contribution package of 90 yuan per year – 60 yuan from 
individuals, and 15 yuan from the city and township governments respectively; tier 
B had a contribution package of 220 yuan per year – 190 yuan from individuals, and 
15 yuan from the city and township governments respectively. Fenggang Township 
selected tier B. A lump sum payment was introduced for the insurance program and 
had to be paid before the end of June the following year. No exemptions or   22 
preferential treatment were allowed with respect to payment, while overdue 
payments were liable to a charge of 0.2 per cent of the receivable amount per day 
overdue.  Those enrolled were eligible to receive 70 per cent of their basic medical 
expenses beyond the deductible reimbursed through the pooled fund.34 This was a 
lower reimbursement rate than that for the employees basic medical insurance (95 
per cent for employees, and 100 per cent for retirees).35 For outpatient expenses, 
the pooled fund would cover 60 per cent of the expenses if the service items were 
covered in the outpatient service catalogue and fell below the ceiling of the basic 
medical insurance provided in the insurance policy. The ceiling for reimbursement 
upon hospitalization and specified outpatient services through the pooled fund was 
not to exceed 35,000 yuan each year. The pooled fund would make a lump sum 
pension payment of 2,000 yuan for enrollees who died from disease. Yantian also 
chose Tier B for premiums. The 190 yuan individual contribution was deducted 
directly by the village collective from their dividends. Statistical information from 
June 2006, showed that 1,780 villagers were enrolled in the farmers’ basic medical 
insurance, 57 per cent of total village population, the remaining 43 per cent were 
covered by the employees’ basic medical insurance.  
In a fourth phase, Dongguan City decided to merge the basic medical insurance 
for farmers and urban employees so that all would enjoy the same benefits, although 
Yantian did not participate. The policy was implemented from July 1, 2008. 
Nevertheless, the two insurance programs are still financed through different 
sources. Furthermore, the policies only benefit those Dongguan people with locally 
registered identification (employees, people receiving a monthly pension or 
unemployment allowance, workers in the informal sector, as well as urban and rural 
residents) but not the Xin Guaner, migrants to Dongguan.  
Although Yantian did not adopt the new system, in spite of the lower 
contribution rate required by the farmers’ basic medical insurance, the new 
program created identical benefits for participants of the two programs, thus 
causing some villagers to shift from the employee’s to the farmers’ package. The 
number of participants in the farmers’ basic medical insurance program exceeded   23 
2,000, increasing its share of the village population from 57 per cent in 2006 to 65 
per cent in 2009 while reducing the share of employee’s program participants 
among the village population from 43 to 35 per cent. 
The reforms in Yantian Village transformed the healthcare system from a 
collective-run village healthcare station model to one where village clinics were 
merely owned by the collective in name only but operated under private contracts 
taken out by individuals. The ambiguous nature of several public facilities such as 
the Yantian Branch Hospital, whether or not they were for-profit of not-for-profit, or 
whether they should be run directly by government has meant that there is actually 
no government spending in the Yantian Branch Hospital. As a result, it has had to 
charge fees to cover costs and the diagnostic and treatment costs, at a so-called 
public hospital, are even higher than in their private counterparts. Instead of dealing 
with market failure under the reforms, this model has exacerbated it, making 
appropriate healthcare services inaccessible for low-income migrants and their 
dependents in Yantian. Poor people had little to gain from healthcare services 
delivered by the government-run hospitals. The absence of government spending 
has also had the consequence that there is little, or no, government spending on 
public health, with especially serious consequences for the large migrant 
community. In terms of equity, registered local villagers enjoy significant 
advantages in seeking medical insurance and utilizing healthcare resources in 
comparison with the migrants. The two groups while living in the same village 
actually inhabit “different worlds.”  
 
Concluding Comments 
The study of education and health provision in Yantian reveals the progress that has 
been made in providing better access for those with a rural household registration 
to key public goods. It also reveals, how despite progress, migrants are still treated 
as second-class citizens in terms of access to resources in the communities where 
they actually live and work.    24 
The system for public service provision is shifting to one that shares key 
features not only with other countries in Asia but also beyond. During the reform 
period, policy has retained the obligation to work, tried to contain costs of any 
program expansion, and allowed considerable privatization of service provision. 
Policy has adopted, often unintentionally, the values and methods of the market to 
allocate public services with the resultant contracting out of services from 
government and workplace to the family, the private service provider or non-
governmental organization. Like other countries in East Asia, China has thus initially 
spent relatively little on public goods and services with high levels of out-of-pocket 
expenses for education and health. It is still the case that where you live and where 
you work are major determinants of the level of benefits available. Under reforms, it 
became increasingly the case, as we have seen in Yantian, that for most people the 
first port of call was the family, collective or workplace. In recent years, this is 
changing and the Central Government has begun to allocate more significant 
funding for compulsory education in rural China and to support the expansion of the 
new rural medical cooperative scheme.36  
While welfare provision remains selective it has become more inclusive. For 
a developing country, government policy has comprised ambitious attempts to 
provide basic support to those is the rural areas. These initiatives could mark a shift 
from a traditional approach to assistance to a modern welfare state. This trend is 
reinforced by the residual impact of the socialist ideology and the quasi-Confucian 
variation of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to build a “harmonious society” and “put 
people first.” Their policies have introduced the glimmers of a rights-based 
consciousness in assessing access to public goods and services. This is one of the 
building blocks of citizenship. This might signal that over the next decade China will 
evolve more in the direction of welfare policy in South Korea than the selective 
application in Hong Kong.  
  During reforms, in Yantian the market and alternative suppliers have begun 
to play an increasing role in service provision. This has supplemented the role of the 
company-based welfare, which has been progressively withdrawn since the reforms   25 
of the state-owned sector were launched in the mid-1990s. This provided the major 
challenge to reform policies, as benefits have had to be shifted from the enterprise 
and in some cases rolled back without undermining CCP support. This “corporatist 
welfare”37 has been more pervasive in China than elsewhere in East Asia and is also 
a major distinction with other Soviet-style systems. The major challenge was to 
weave the fragmented systems into a more coherent whole by transferring welfare 
obligations to local state administrative agencies and other institutions. 
  While policy may be moving toward a welfare system based on citizenship, 
migrants remain significantly disadvantaged. One could argue that this is the case 
with the broader provision of public service provision, for example, with the 
massive investment in rural infrastructure. Future policy design for service delivery 
and the extension of benefits should be based on a notion of citizenship that further 
breaks down the barriers between urban and rural China, the informal and formal 
sectors of the economy, and between those in government employ and those who 
are not. The provision of free education for rural dwellers, the introduction of the 
minimum living support scheme for both urban and rural dwellers and the 
extension of a pension scheme to some rural inhabitants are good examples of 
policy direction that confirm steps in the direction of a citizen-based approach to 
public service provision.  
The shift in treatment of migrants is interesting in this context. The study of 
Yantian reveals that despite enhanced access to education, problems of access and 
cost remain; even more so in the case of healthcare. Policy in the 1980s and the 
1990s was dedicated to delinking employment from one’s household registration 
(hukou) status, under Hu and Wen policy has been to de-link social services and 
welfare benefits from hukou status. The notion is no longer tenable that migrants 
did not need welfare support as they had land in their home villages as insurance. 
Many migrants are now permanent fixtures in the urban areas and “urban villages” 
such as Yantian together with their families and may no longer have any land back 
in their place of registration. While hukou reforms of the earlier period until 2002-  26 
03 benefited mainly investors and those who are well educated (and reflected the 
more elitist thrust of Jiang Zemin’s and Zhu Rongji’s policy), the Hu-Wen leadership 
shifted policy focus to providing training, and social welfare coverage to migrant 
workers. We see a clear impact of the Jiang-Zhu policies in Yantian with the 
preferential treatment given to those who had invested there and who were 
considered to have made a significant contribution to its development.   
Already in November 2008, Dongguan set up the first local government bureau 
in China to serve the migrant population. This bureau was intended to provide 
benefits to migrants in the areas of social security, employment, children’s schooling 
and medical insurance. The Dongguan party secretary noted that the intention was 
to see that the “Xin Guaner” were “given the same treatment as other citizens.”38  
Migrants were to be issued a new type of “service card” that contains basic 
information including name, ID number, address, workplace and medical insurance. 
In 2004, Beijing introduced regulations on medical and occupational injury that 
required employers to pay the premiums for migrant workers’ insurance that would 
give them the same access as urban residents. The medical insurance was to cover 
large hospitalization bills and limited outpatient services. The insurance would only 
be valid during periods when the migrant was employed in Beijing. 39 Those who are 
now long-term inhabitants should, in theory, enjoy better access to urban services. 
The policy initiatives to incorporate migrants into welfare systems and services in 
their chosen place of work also offer the potential of developing a welfare system 
based on citizenship.  
Continued policy movement in this direction would resemble what T. H. 
Marshall calls, in the context of Western Europe, “social citizenship” that 
encompasses the right to economic welfare and social security. In China, this 
process is likely to precede “political citizenship.”40 This fits with the CCP’s 
preference for economic and social rights over political rights41 and reflects the 
policy focus of Hu and Wen, the remnant influences of socialist ideology on policy,   27 
and the CCP’s claim to speak for all the nation’s people thus rejecting the need for 
any political opposition.  
The lack of political voice remains the most important obstacle to progress for 
migrant workers. Unable to organize effectively to promote their policy preferences, 
they are forced to rely on informal mechanisms or the benevolence of the 
authorities to advance their interests. This is seen clearly in Yantian where there are 
some 3,000 registered inhabitants and approximately 70,000 migrants. The 
registered residents control the wealth of the village and the political power. They 
share the dividends from the collective funds that are accumulated from the 
enterprise fees and benefit from subsidies paid towards education and health. Most 
importantly, the migrants enjoy no political rights as they are not eligible to vote in 
the village elections. Essentially, their benefits and general welfare depend on 
legislation from higher levels of government that demand the expansion of their 
access to welfare or the largesse of the local residents, dominated by the Deng 
family. “Political Citizenship” even at the local level still seems some way off.    28 
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